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Motivation: The research aims at evaluating the anomalies and unusual patterns of accounting 
numbers reported by Italian universities. 
Prior literature and evidence on local authorities suggest that failing institutions may engage in 
fraudulent financial reporting to conceal their distress and avoid regulatory intervention. They 
manipulate accounting values within the scope of the generally accepted accounting principles, using 
estimates and adjustments for achieving a desired result. Often, they overestimate the receivables and 
underestimate the payables in order to present a higher level of surplus or a minor deficit. 
Therefore, the research examines the receivables and payables values contained in the financial 
reports of Italian universities during the years 2004-2012, hypothesizing that a gradual reduction of 
the ordinary funding from the Ministry, and the difficulty of attracting private resources, caused 
financial stress and led management to accounting manipulations. 
Object and methodology: We apply a mathematical law, known as Benford’s Law, to the receivables 
and payables reported values, obtained from the Statistical Office of the Ministry of Higher Education, 
for identifying the existence of manipulated numbers. 
Benford’s Law implies that, in a naturally occurring set of numbers, the leading digits of the numbers 
are discrete exponentially distributed rather than uniformly distributed, meaning that the numbers 1 
through 9 do not have equal probability of occurring. In particular, the number 1 occurs as the leading 
digit about 30% of the time, while the number 9 occurs as the first digit less than 5% of the time. As 
Benford’s Law shows that there is some predictability in the distribution of the first digit in a series of 
data, it can be used to indicate the presence of fictitious or artificially manipulated numbers. 
Results: Surprisingly, the statistical tests show a large degree of compliance between the observed and 
the expected distributions. The conformity is clear and persistent over all the 9 years. 
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1. The institutional context of Italian universities 
 
The art. 33 of the Italian Constitution entrusts to the law the power to lay down the general 
rules for education and to establish public schools for all orders and degrees. The same 
article recognizes the private’s right to establish schools and educational institutions, and 
states that they can adopt their own regulations within the limits set by the laws. Therefore, 
Italian education is a public good and a public responsibility, and universities, state and non-
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state they are, develop a public function serving the community. They are endowed with 
legal status and they have greater teaching, scientific, organizational, financial and 
accounting autonomy. In accordance to the New Public Management move, the conditions 
they have to respect derive from the role of the Ministry of Higher Education (MIUR) as a 
monitor of the universities’ efficiency and effectiveness as well as the functionality of the 
whole higher education sector (Mandanici, 2011, pp. 5-30). 
 
The expansion of university autonomy has been taking place since the Law n. 168/1989. The 
major change refers on the amount and modalities by which resources flow from national 
government to universities. Particularly, the Law n. 537/1993 provided a new funding 
formula, partially associated with results: each university receives a global lump-sum budget 
(called Fondo di Finanziamento Ordinario, briefly FFO), without previous stringent 
restrictions on internal allocations, shaped in accordance to both the educational and 
research performance. During the years, this system has been reinforced by the Law n. 
244/2007 and the Legislative Decree n. 19/2012, according to which MIUR selects and 
rewards with additional funds those universities that had the ability to achieve their planned 
objectives. 
 
The rise of public debt and the general crisis have contributed to accelerate the 
implementation of the financial autonomy. This phenomenon is common to other EU and 
OECD countries. Italy was among the countries that have set the main cut to the university 
sector: about 20% of the FFO from 2008 to 2013. This choice has appeared critical for the 
following reasons. 
 
First, public funding represents, on average, close to 75% and 84% of, respectively, EU and 
OECD universities’ financial structures (EUA 2011, p. 80; OECD 2013, p. 200), and in Italy the 
percentage rises to 90%. 
 
Second, Italy traditionally invests in tertiary education a value consistently lower than the 
average of other countries. For example, in 2010 Italy has invested 1% of its GDP, while the 
EU and the OECD, respectively, 1,4% and 1,6%. Splitting the percentage between public and 
private funding, it appears more difficult for Italian universities to attract private resources 
than other countries: expenditure covered by individuals and business, in percentage of 
GDP, ranges from an average of 0,2% in Italy to 0,3% in EU and 0,5% in OECD countries. 
 
Third, students contributions, or fees, potentially constitute the most directly available 
financial source. The amount of fees charged to students is however a choice that pertains 
to the national government, being related to the design of the fiscal policy of each country. 
In Italy, universities determine the level of tuition fees under a strait ceiling set by law: the 
art. 5 of the Decree of the President of the Republic n. 306/1997 states that the students 
contributions cannot exceed 20% of the annual FFO. Consequently, the cut in the public 
funding will also have the effect of diminishing the universities income from tuition fees. 
 
These considerations show that Italian universities rely heavily on public funding. This means 
that any change can potentially have the highest impact on their stability and durability. 
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In the same period, the massification of higher education and the new societal demands on 
universities have increased costs they are confronted with. 
 
The widening funding gap has put universities finances and financial reports even more 
under pressure. In order to conceal distress and avoid regulatory intervention, university 
managers may have been engaged in accounting manipulations. Therefore, this study aims 
at evaluating the anomalies and unusual patterns of accounting numbers reported by Italian 
universities in their financial reports. 
 
The next section presents the characteristics of the financial report made by Italian 
universities, and explains why we chose to analyze the receivables and payables accounting 
numbers. The section 3 describes the methodology and introduces the mathematics relating 
to the Benford’s Law used for the empirical investigation. Results are presented in the 
section 4, and the section 5 provides the conclusions. 
 
 
2. The accounting system of Italian universities 
 
The current accounting system of Italian universities is a cash accounting system, intended 
to register and control the revenues and expenses, measuring the change of the financial 
wealth over time. 
 
Management operations are authorized through the budget approved by the Board of 
Directors. On the revenue side, the accounting records verify the right to collect the money, 
and the time of the money collection. On the expenditure side, the accounting entries verify 
the occurrence of the debt, then its liquidation, which certifies the execution of the service, 
and, finally, the payment. At the end of the year, the receivables are all the rights expected 
to collect in cash from third entities during next years, while the payables are obligations not 
paid yet to creditors. In one year, therefore, revenues may refer to the right to collect 
money verified in the current year, and to the right of the previous one or more years, that is 
receivables. Similarly, in the same year, payments can be linked to the debt occurred in the 
current year, and to the debt of the previous one or more years, that is the payables. 
 
The financial report derives from the sequence of these operations, highlighting the balance 
between revenues and expenditures. If the result is positive, the surplus can be used during 
the next years to cover new spending and to make new investments; if negative, the deficit 
will have to be repaid with a policy aimed at reducing expenditures or increase revenues. 
The remedies have to be made within a time limit related to the amount of monetary stock: 
when it runs out, there will be a lack of liquidity, which will lead to financial crisis. 
 
It might seem that a university whose report shows a surplus should not face a financial risk. 
However, the literature and empirical studies on the failure of local authorities (Gori et al., 
2013; Manes Rossi, 2010; Cimbolini and Moriconi, 2009; Tenuta, 2008) demonstrate that the 
surplus does not always indicate the good performance of the institution. Particularly, the 
Italian Court of Auditors (2012) noted that, in the year preceding the declaration of 
insolvency, only a minority of the failed local authorities recorded a deficit. Obviously, these 
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institutions reached a surplus thanks to the manipulation of receivables and payables 
accounting numbers. 
 
In a survey carried out by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) (2009, p. 55), 
the receivables are considered among the most critical factors influencing the financial risk 
of the local authorities. Even the Court (2011, p. 412) indicates the presence of receivables 
as one of the most common causes of financial distress. Specially, the Court says that it is 
dangerous to keep in the financial report all the receivables overvalued, antiquated and bad, 
or at least those of difficult and doubtful collectability. 
 
Indeed, according to the art. 228 of the Legislative Decree n. 267/2000 (known briefly as 
TUEL), the local authority has to review the reasons for maintaining all or part of the 
receivables in the financial report: it is not allowed to keep receivables that are difficult to 
turn into cash resources, since it involves an undue expansion of the surplus, or an 
erroneous deficit reduction. Similarly, it is necessary to eliminate payables related to debts 
taken out to finance works that have proved to be successful. This would free up resources 
no longer needed to fund expenses, transferring economies to the surplus. 
 
The opposite behavior creates an accounting irregularity, and it hinders the clear and 
accurate representation of management operations. 
 
However, the number of declarations of insolvency has decreased over time (Gori and Fissi, 
2013, pp. 328-329), and it is less than the number of local authorities in financial distress 
(MEF, 2008, p. 60). This means that many administrators hide the deficit with unreal 
receivables, condemning their institution to remain or even increase the instability. 
 
Many authors observe that public managers may engage in accounting manipulations to 
avoid the declaration of insolvency and the external compulsory administration. The current 
legislation states that local authorities should provide independently to its rehabilitation, 
without any financial help from the central government. This can lead the managers to 
dislike the declaration of insolvency, since the reorganization affects directly and totally on 
the local community. According to the previous regulation (the Legislative Decree n. 
166/1989), the national government contributed to the financing of past debts of the local 
authorities. After the Constitutional Law n. 3/2001, the State can no longer help any entities 
with extraordinary contributions: all financial resources must be found through the sale of 
real estate assets, the cost savings, the services reduction, and the taxation. Therefore, 
today the local authority uses the declaration of insolvency only when management is 
undermined by the executive actions of creditors, and when, especially after inspections, 
there is a need to bring the budgets within the limits of the accounting and financial 
legitimacy, damaged by accounting manipulation. 
 
Even university managers may engage in accounting manipulations to avoid the declaration 
of insolvency and the external compulsory administration. These tools are introduced by the 
Legislative Decree n. 199/2011, and they are in line with the current legislation on local 
authorities. Further, the decree defines a set of parameters that the board of auditors of 
each university has to apply to the financial report for assessing the state of insolvency (Villa, 
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2012). The subsequent Legislative Decree n. 49/2012 indicates the red flag level of these 
parameters and the conditions leading to the external compulsory administration. 
 
We might assume that the university managers use estimates and adjustments to avoid the 
red flag level of the parameters. Specifically, they may overestimate the receivables and 
underestimate the payables in order to report a higher amount of surplus or a minor deficit, 
influencing the level of financial performance. Consequently, in the next section we examine 
the receivables and payables numbers contained in the financial reports of Italian 
universities, after a brief discussion on the meaning of accounting manipulation in a cash-
based accounting system. 
 
 
2.1. The accounting manipulations in a cash based accounting system 
 
The concept of accounting manipulation arises in the private sector, and has become an 
issue of critical importance when the Enron, WorldCom and Tyco financial statement frauds 
rocked the financial community. Despite the growing literature on the subject, there is no 
common definition of the phenomenon, either it has been applied to the public sector. 
 
In most cases, researchers argue that accounting manipulation tied to a profit aim, being a 
technique or a set of actions deliberately employed by managers to achieve a desired level 
of reported earning. Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) consider it occurs «when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports 
to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on the reported accounting 
numbers». 
 
There are many ways that managers can exercise judgments in financial reporting, and the 
range of manipulation can vary within the context of legal and illegal actions. In Italy, the law 
and the accepted accounting principles allow for a certain degree of interpretation and 
choices. To be legal, the interpretation has to be in keeping with their spirit. In general, 
accounting manipulation refers to a deliberated action that operates within the letter of the 
law and the accounting standards, but it is clearly against their spirit. 
 
Practically, profit oriented entities may engage in accounting manipulations through, for 
example, the extension of the useful life of a depreciable asset or the change of inventory 
evaluation method from FIFO to LIFO. 
 
Universities are public entities, and they do not have a profit aim. Consequently, they cannot 
manage the earning, but the financial aspect of their operations, determining the surplus or 
the deficit in the financial report. Therefore, on the revenue side, they can anticipate the 
accounting entries, or they can overvalue the receivables, or maintain those receivables 
which are difficult and doubtful to collect. On the expenditure side, they can postpone an 
accounting entries or a liquidation of a service already received. 
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Alternatively, managers may engage in fraudulent financial reporting techniques, such as 
falsification of documents and alteration of accounting records. These are clearly not within 
the standards. 
 
Whatever is the technique, the intensity and the motivation for accounting manipulations, 
two research designs are commonly used in the literature to detect frauds and irregularities. 
The first approach uses the existence and amount of accruals as a proxy of earning 
management, hypothesizing that increased discretionary accruals indicate the opportunistic 
manipulations of financial reporting numbers. This approach can be used in the private 
sector, where the accounting system is accrual-based (Jones, 1991; Beneish, 1999). 
 
The second approach tests the presence of accounting manipulation by examining the 
distributions of numbers in large sample of data. The abnormal digit frequencies indicate a 
manipulation of data sets. This approach is known as digit analysis, and we apply it because 





In an article published in the American Journal of Mathematics in 1881, the astronomer 
Simon Newcomb described a pattern, which was seemingly inexplicable, regarding the 
numbers. He (1881) observed: «That the ten digits do not occur with equal frequency must 
be evident to any one making much use of logarithmic tables, and noticing how much faster 
the first pages wear out than the last ones. The first significant figure is oftener 1 than any 
other digit, and the frequency diminishes up to 9». 
 
Based on the above observation, Newcomb came to the conclusion that if we consider a 
sequence of positive real numbers and assuming that the mantissas of their logarithms are 
equally probable, then it is possible to determine the percentage of the numbers whose first 
digit is 1 up to 9. Similarly, it is possible to determine the percentages of the second digit 
(from 0 to 9), and so on up to n-th digit. He went so far as to sketch out the formula he 
expected the first digit to follow. 
 
In particular, the probability of observing the digit d1 as the first significant digit (D1) of the 








The table 1 shows the expected frequencies for the first digit (D1) and the second digit (D2) 
of a number. The frequencies of the first digits are heavily skewed with a probability of 
30,1% for the digit 1, and only 4,58% for the digit 9. This is more evident in the Figure 1, 
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which graphically shows the expected frequencies for the first digit (D1). The second digit 
frequencies are less skewed, with a probability of 11,97% for the digit 0, and 8,50% for the 
digit 9 (Figure 2). 
 
d1/d2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 p(d1) 
1 0,0414 0,0378 0,0348 0,0322 0,0300 0,0280 0,0263 0,0248 0,0235 0,0223 0,3010 
2 0,0212 0,0202 0,0193 0,0185 0,0177 0,0170 0,0164 0,0158 0,0152 0,0147 0,1761 
3 0,0142 0,0138 0,0134 0,0130 0,0126 0,0122 0,0119 0,0116 0,0113 0,0110 0,1249 
4 0,0107 0,0105 0,0102 0,0100 0,0098 0,0095 0,0093 0,0091 0,0090 0,0088 0,0969 
5 0,0086 0,0084 0,0083 0,0081 0,0080 0,0078 0,0077 0,0076 0,0074 0,0073 0,0792 
6 0,0072 0,0071 0,0069 0,0068 0,0067 0,0066 0,0065 0,0064 0,0063 0,0062 0,0669 
7 0,0062 0,0061 0,0060 0,0059 0,0058 0,0058 0,0057 0,0056 0,0055 0,0055 0,0580 
8 0,0054 0,0053 0,0053 0,0052 0,0051 0,0051 0,0050 0,0050 0,0049 0,0049 0,0512 
9 0,0048 0,0047 0,0047 0,0046 0,0046 0,0045 0,0045 0,0045 0,0044 0,0044 0,0458 
p(d2) 0,1197 0,1139 0,1088 0,1043 0,1003 0,0967 0,0934 0,0904 0,0876 0,0850 1,0000 
Table 1: Expected digital frequencies D1 and D2 
 
 
Figure 1: Expected frequencies for the first digit D1 
 
 
Figure 2: Expected frequencies for the second digits D2 
 
Many years later, the physicist at General Electric laboratories, Frank Benford, presented in a 






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
First Digit Base 10 
Benford's Law 1 digit
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physical constants, etc...) that showed a surprisingly great adaptation to this logarithmic law. 
Since then, the law has been referred to as Benford’s Law. 
 
The fact that a series of random numbers respected Benford’s Law has suggested using it to 
detect fraudulent data in applications as diverse as election campaign finance (Tam Cho and 
Gaines, 2007) and toxic gas emission (De Marchi and Hamilton, 2006). Among the fields of 
Benford’s Law application, there are also accounting and financial statements (Ciaponi and 
Mandanici, 2014; Quick and Wolz, 2005; Durtschi et al., 2004; Skousen et al., 2004; Van 
Caneghem, 2002; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Thomas, 1989; Carslaw, 1988 ), tax auditing 
(Watrin et al., 2008; Niskanen and Keloharju, 2000; Nigrini, 1996), and auditing procedures 
(Guan et al., 2006; Jackson and Pitman, 2001; Nigrini and Mittermainer, 1997). Generally, 
many studies addressed the earnings management issues through the use of Benford 
distribution. This is the first time it is applied to the cash-based accounting system adopted 
by universities. 
 
Specifically, the research hypothesis are as follows: 
H1: the observed distribution of receivables and payables numbers does not conform to the 
expected Benford’s Law distribution, evidencing intentional manipulations. 
H2: the degree of accounting manipulation grows when the ministerial funding decreases. 
 
We expect that the result is consistent with the results of a recent survey conducted on the 
financial risk of the Italian state universities. Mandanici and Pace (2014) define and translate 
the financial risk factors in a series of 12 warning indicators of crisis, and they calculate a 
synthetic financial risk indicator as the sum of the scores recorded by each of them, for the 
years from 2009 to 2012. They found that the medium sized universities are riskier than 
small, large and very large universities. For many universities defined riskier, the results are 
matching to the facts reported in the major national newspapers, as for the University of 
Siena and the University of Pesaro-Urbino. 
 
We can hypothesize that the riskier universities manipulate their reported values more 
frequently than the other universities. Therefore, in order to allow comparison, we can 
operate a stratification of the data in 4 macro classes, following the same dimensional 
criteria adopted in the cited survey. 
 
 
3.1. Data collection 
 
The analysis was conducted on the financial reports of the Italian universities provided by 
the Statistical Office of the MIUR. This ensures the consistency of the data collected. We 
excluded universities that have adopted the accrual-based accounting as well as universities 
whose data are lacking in one or more years from 2004 to 2012. The first column of the 
tables in the Appendix lists all the 61 analysed universities. 
 
We can apply the Benford’s Law to their receivables and payables reported numbers 
because they satisfy the following conditions (Nigrini, 2012): 
 all the numbers are recorded in the same unit of measurement; 
 the numbers do not have an arbitrary maximum and/or minimum cut-off point; 
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 the numbers are not assigned, such as personal identification numbers, invoice 
numbers and postal codes; 
 the numbers are not influenced by human thought, such as psychological 
supermarket prices (which often have 9 as a last digit, like 1,99 €); 
 the numbers do not have a wide dispersion (Raimi, 1976). 
 
 
3.2. Testing methodology 
 
We identify receivables and payables manipulations by searching for abnormal first digits 
and second digits frequencies in numbers recorded by each university in their 2004-2012 
financial report. The degree of deviation from the Benford distribution is assessed by the 
Chi-squared test. 
 
The most common tests are the Z-statistic and the Chi-square. The first test measures the 
significance of the deviation from the expected digit distribution for each digit separately. It 
is a digit-by-digit analysis that shows whether a single digit occurs more or less often than it 
is expected according to Benford’s Law. 
 
Our objective is to signal suspicious of receivables and payables manipulation during the 
years, and not what figures in the number are more or less frequently used. 
 
Consequently, this research uses the Chi-square test, a test-by-test analysis, which compares 
the expected distribution over all digits with the observed distribution, indicating whether 
the observed distribution significantly differs from the expected one. The literature (Cleary 
and Thibodeau, 2005) also suggests the use of test-by-test analysis to catch data sets, which 
are under suspicion of having been manipulated, and the use of digit-by-digit analysis for an 
in-depth investigation regarding the causes behind the abnormality. 




where AC is the observed digit frequency, EC is the expected digit frequency according to 
Benford’s Law, and K is the number of possible digits I in the first position in numbers (K = 9). 
The numerator is the residual of the compared distributions, squared in order to get rid of 
negative values. It is divided by the expected observations, to normalize bigger and smaller 
counts. 
 
The conformity of the whole distribution is tested choosing an alpha level of significance. 
Generally, the alpha level varies according to the size of the sample observed from 0,05 to 
0,01 or 0,001. We choose the level 0,05. 
 
The appendix provides the results of the computed Chi-squared test of the first and the 
second digit of receivables and payables numbers. The test shows that the observed data are 
clearly correspondent with the Benford’s distribution, during all the years 2004-2012. In 
other word, there is statistically no difference between the distribution of receivables and 
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payables numbers and the distribution expected from Benford’s Law. The conformity is clear 
and persistent over all the 9 years. Therefore, the two hypothesis are rejected, and any 
dimensional stratification does not involve changes to the results. 
 
 
4. Results and findings 
 
The results provide empirical evidence that: 
- the receivables and payables values conform to Benford’s Law; 
- during financial distress, universities did not carry out intentional manipulations. 
 
The first result was expected, not the second. We tried the reasons and we have identified 
the following: 
- the lack of legislation on financial distress of universities during the analysed years 
2004-2011; 
- the freedom to allocate public funding and private resources to different budget 
lines, independently from the MIUR. 
-  
The declaration of insolvency was introduced in the Italian universities only with the 
mentioned decrees in 2011 and 2012. Clearly, they can have a negative impact on key 
stakeholders, penalizing the financial and organizational autonomy, as well as the credibility 
of both the training and research conducted by the university. During the investigated 
period, universities have not been forced to heavy accounting manipulations by such a 
punitive legislation. Manipulations could be undertaken to achieve a balance between 
revenues and expenditure in financial reporting. Probably, universities will engage more 
frequently in accounting manipulations when this legislation comes into force. Such a 
behavior would be in line with that taken by local authorities as a result of the Constitutional 
Law n. 3/2001. In the absence of a state extraordinary contributions, all financial resources 
must be found within the university. Consequently, we expect that universities will resort to 
receivables and payables manipulation in order to avoid the declaration of insolvency. 
 
We also expect a greater use of manipulations into the universities which cannot allocate 
their funds, independently from the MIUR, to the different budget lines. Therefore, the line-
item funding systems may represent an incitement to manipulations in respect to the block-
grant systems. The majority of the EU countries uses the block grant formula. The sum is 
split into broad categories and there are no or limited possibilities to move funds between 
these. This is the case of France, Portugal and Sweden. In Italy, like other EU countries such 
as UK, Norway, The Netherlands and Spain, in addition to the block grant funding formula, 
there are no restrictions on the internal allocation of funds, and, moreover, the surplus can 
be kept by universities without any external approval or amount limitation. This reduces the 
use of accounting manipulation among the different budget lines, because the liquidity is 
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5.  Conclusions 
 
During the last years, there has been a general tendency of reforming traditional cash 
accounting of public entities towards business-like accrual accounting. In particular, through 
a long process started with the Legislative Decree n. 240/2010, the MIUR is reforming the 
university sector, putting on the same level the economic and financial conditions, and 
introducing, among other documents, the accrual accounting and the balance sheet. The 
main reason is that the cash accounting is perceived as being too much focused on a 
legislative control mechanism of public funds, without providing management information. 
On the contrary, the new accounting system aims at measuring academic assets and 
liabilities, and at improving performance management and long.term sustainability. 
 
Therefore, future researches will have the opportunity to apply the Benford’s Law to a long 
list of discretionary accruals, and not only to the receivables and payables numbers. 
 
The novelty in the use of Benford’s Law is that managers (and auditors) analyse the 
relationships between the elements of a data set of accruals to determine whether they are 
reasonable, focusing on the consistency of the data set as a whole rather than on the single 
value. More specifically, they could assume that the reported accruals follow Benford’s Law, 
assigning an expected frequency to each number of a list. They could carry out a statistical 
analysis, and they should focus on the significant deviations of numbers from their expected 
values or their uncommon variation over particular periods: deviations might signal 
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Polytechnic MARCHE 0,52 41 0,44 41 0,04 96 0,66 96 
BARI 0,84 35 0,48 35 0,70 135 0,93 135 
BOLOGNA 0,02 65 0,27 64 0,27 102 0,50 102 
CAGLIARI 0,12 49 0,38 48 0,84 76 0,74 76 
CASSINO 0,87 31 0,38 31 0,87 64 0,20 64 
CATANIA 0,84 38 0,12 38 0,55 138 0,07 135 
FERRARA 0,29 45 0,63 44 0,78 113 0,36 113 
FIRENZE 0,05 34 0,22 34 0,93 123 0,27 123 
GENOVA 0,39 56 0,35 56 0,07 95 0,59 95 
SALENTO 0,93 36 0,94 36 0,41 107 0,83 107 
MACERATA 0,40 35 0,08 34 0,64 80 0,34 80 
MESSINA 0,83 36 0,51 35 0,91 128 0,98 128 
MILANO 0,07 44 0,36 44 0,58 98 0,71 98 
Polytechnic MILANO 0,11 35 0,82 34 0,38 97 0,96 97 
MODENA and 
REGGIO EMILIA 
0,04 50 0,39 50 0,75 122 0,07 121 
NAPOLI Federico II 0,68 62 0,49 62 0,71 119 0,04 119 
PADOVA 0,04 45 0,71 45 0,54 85 0,71 84 
PALERMO 0,24 44 0,14 44 0,61 124 0,06 124 
PARMA 0,68 17 0,38 16 0,68 76 0,73 74 
PAVIA 0,25 57 0,40 57 0,72 114 0,90 111 
PERUGIA 0,02 55 0,14 55 0,54 103 0,67 103 
PISA 0,24 46 0,15 46 0,87 113 0,43 113 
ROMA La Sapienza 0,88 52 0,47 52 0,24 121 0,50 120 
ROMA Tor Vergata 0,15 42 0,04 42 0,69 88 0,39 88 
SALERNO 0,98 50 0,17 50 0,80 123 0,57 123 
SASSARI 0,54 50 0,11 50 0,06 112 0,52 112 
SIENA 0,43 21 0,50 21 0,12 113 0,82 113 
TORINO 0,49 75 0,25 75 0,15 106 0,60 106 
VITERBO 1,00 48 0,31 48 0,28 107 0,47 107 
VENEZIA Ca’ Foscari 0,27 39 0,33 39 0,38 102 0,78 102 
VENEZIA I.U.A.V. 0,48 30 0,37 30 0,72 85 0,25 85 
BASILICATA 0,55 37 0,34 37 0,95 102 0,20 101 
MOLISE 0,61 36 0,05 36 0,47 55 0,45 55 
VERONA 0,46 32 0,28 32 0,34 102 0,54 100 
NAPOLI Parthenope 0,56 32 0,80 32 0,27 106 0,39 106 
NAPOLI L'Orientale 0,00 36 0,91 35 0,02 82 0,15 80 
PISA Normale 0,47 19 0,55 19 0,43 70 0,30 70 
PISA Sant'Anna 0,84 31 0,63 31 0,57 57 0,70 57 
TRIESTE S.I.S.S.A. 0,30 24 0,08 24 0,67 87 0,12 86 
BRESCIA 0,49 39 0,66 39 0,67 118 0,67 118 
REGGIO CALABRIA 0,60 31 0,51 31 0,02 85 0,40 84 
Polytechnic BARI 0,23 47 0,40 46 0,30 104 0,31 103 
NAPOLI Seconda 
Università 
0,19 40 0,72 40 0,06 99 0,05 98 
BERGAMO 0,59 28 0,86 28 0,69 85 0,84 85 
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,15 32 0,92 32 0,08 93 0,72 90 
L'AQUILA 0,05 24 0,64 24 0,84 67 0,24 67 
URBINO 0,09 26 0,24 25 0,32 89 0,26 88 
University for 
Foreigners of SIENA 




0,14 24 0,61 24 0,08 56 0,99 56 
ROMA TRE 0,63 30 0,68 30 0,55 73 0,32 72 
TERAMO 0,77 27 0,19 27 0,07 88 0,75 88 
ROMA Foro Italico 0,54 20 0,62 20 1,00 74 0,76 73 
 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE RESISTANCE: EXPERIENCE FROM PUBLIC SECTOR 99 
BENEVENTO 0,56 29 0,48 29 0,33 75 0,57 74 
CATANZARO 0,12 34 0,30 34 0,68 75 0,45 74 
MILANO Bicocca 0,11 43 0,38 40 0,61 101 0,91 101 
INSUBRIA 0,61 40 0,32 40 0,91 81 0,62 80 
PIEMONTE 
ORIENTALE 
0,63 51 0,76 51 0,36 79 0,87 79 
FOGGIA 0,84 33 0,12 33 0,29 104 0,83 103 
PAVIA I.U.S.S. 0,82 17 0,48 17 0,71 62 0,50 61 
LUCCA I.M.T. 0,83 18 0,73 18 0,52 76 0,75 76 



















Polytechnic MARCHE 0,12 45 0,61 45 0,73 75 0,60 75 
BARI 0,31 32 0,24 32 0,19 112 0,38 110 
BOLOGNA 0,54 68 0,79 67 0,95 91 0,82 91 
CAGLIARI 0,81 47 0,94 47 0,92 99 0,90 98 
CASSINO 0,78 31 0,33 31 0,03 52 0,27 52 
CATANIA 0,15 34 0,52 34 0,61 96 0,60 96 
FERRARA 0,56 48 0,40 48 0,28 101 0,31 101 
FIRENZE 0,26 35 0,08 35 0,64 112 0,97 112 
GENOVA 0,91 57 0,73 60 0,33 98 0,75 98 
SALENTO 0,49 41 0,87 41 0,95 107 0,45 107 
MACERATA 0,59 33 0,30 33 0,58 80 0,79 80 
MESSINA 0,85 31 0,87 31 0,03 128 0,92 128 
MILANO 0,20 44 0,65 44 0,75 98 0,24 98 
Polytechnic MILANO 0,85 40 0,55 40 0,21 97 0,17 97 
MODENA and 
REGGIO EMILIA 
0,18 49 0,18 49 0,80 122 0,40 122 
NAPOLI Federico II 0,74 60 0,65 60 0,65 119 0,19 119 
PADOVA 0,10 43 0,38 43 0,49 85 0,90 85 
PALERMO 0,15 44 0,56 44 0,89 124 0,68 124 
PARMA 0,57 18 0,82 18 0,36 76 0,08 76 
PAVIA 0,06 54 0,10 54 0,90 114 0,24 114 
PERUGIA 0,15 61 0,21 61 0,75 103 0,20 103 
PISA 0,61 48 0,56 48 0,68 113 0,76 113 
ROMA La Sapienza 0,76 50 0,09 50 0,75 121 0,21 121 
ROMA Tor Vergata 0,10 41 0,66 41 0,28 88 0,42 88 
SALERNO 0,79 53 0,58 53 0,17 123 0,50 123 
SASSARI 0,63 50 0,11 50 0,78 112 0,28 112 
SIENA 0,06 23 0,20 23 0,53 113 0,51 113 
TORINO 0,62 78 0,80 78 0,69 106 0,61 106 
VITERBO 0,45 46 0,35 46 0,38 107 0,52 107 
VENEZIA Ca’ Foscari 0,64 50 0,46 50 0,66 102 0,55 102 
VENEZIA I.U.A.V. 0,46 29 0,02 29 0,24 85 0,12 85 
BASILICATA 0,71 38 0,20 38 0,69 102 0,19 102 
MOLISE 0,69 44 0,11 44 0,26 55 0,11 55 
VERONA 0,73 34 0,06 34 0,14 102 0,21 102 
NAPOLI Parthenope 0,44 32 0,59 32 0,49 106 0,89 106 
NAPOLI L'Orientale 0,45 34 0,16 33 0,49 82 0,64 82 
PISA Normale 0,41 22 0,69 22 0,58 70 0,38 70 
PISA Sant'Anna 0,95 40 0,03 40 0,39 57 0,14 57 
TRIESTE S.I.S.S.A. 0,00 27 0,59 27 0,70 87 0,25 87 
BRESCIA 0,40 38 0,59 38 0,61 118 0,27 118 
REGGIO CALABRIA 0,92 34 0,88 34 0,34 85 0,68 85 
Polytechnic BARI 0,51 49 0,93 48 0,46 104 0,17 104 
NAPOLI Seconda 
Università 
0,12 37 0,28 37 0,49 99 0,24 99 
BERGAMO 0,18 27 0,10 27 0,81 85 0,46 85 
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,39 32 0,12 32 0,70 93 0,37 93 
L'AQUILA 0,47 25 0,42 25 0,88 67 0,81 67 
URBINO 0,58 30 0,01 30 0,71 89 0,52 89 
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0,00 20 0,12 19 0,21 56 0,80 56 
ROMA TRE 0,61 26 0,02 26 0,10 73 0,42 73 
TERAMO 0,76 27 0,31 27 0,70 88 0,24 88 
ROMA Foro Italico 0,40 26 0,52 26 0,44 74 0,29 74 
BENEVENTO 0,85 30 0,81 30 0,42 75 0,72 75 
CATANZARO 0,20 34 0,04 32 0,31 75 0,23 75 
MILANO Bicocca 0,26 45 0,26 43 0,55 101 0,81 101 
INSUBRIA 0,26 45 0,26 43 0,71 81 0,45 81 
PIEMONTE 
ORIENTALE 
0,67 59 0,62 59 0,10 79 0,87 79 
FOGGIA 0,76 35 0,42 35 0,26 104 0,40 104 
PAVIA I.U.S.S. 0,66 14 0,39 14 0,78 62 0,67 62 
LUCCA I.M.T. 0,22 16 0,50 16 0,70 76 0,23 76 



















Polytechnic MARCHE 0,55 42 0,56 42 0,70 77 0,20 77 
BARI 0,86 31 0,24 31 0,19 114 0,38 114 
BOLOGNA 0,48 70 0,79 70 0,95 94 0,82 94 
CAGLIARI 0,74 44 0,94 44 0,92 99 0,90 99 
CASSINO 0,29 30 0,33 30 0,03 51 0,27 51 
CATANIA 0,25 37 0,52 37 0,61 97 0,60 97 
FERRARA 0,17 48 0,40 48 0,28 101 0,31 101 
FIRENZE 0,67 33 0,08 33 0,64 113 0,97 113 
GENOVA 0,91 58 0,73 58 0,57 99 0,50 99 
SALENTO 0,61 40 0,87 40 0,28 110 0,62 110 
MACERATA 0,47 32 0,30 32 0,98 79 0,21 79 
MESSINA 0,62 29 0,87 29 0,51 128 0,09 128 
MILANO 0,13 42 0,65 42 0,92 100 0,33 100 
Polytechnic MILANO 0,41 38 0,55 38 0,79 98 0,84 98 
MODENA and 
REGGIO EMILIA 
0,24 47 0,18 47 0,92 125 0,67 125 
NAPOLI Federico II 0,7 57 0,65 57 0,80 121 0,48 121 
PADOVA 0,88 45 0,38 45 0,58 86 0,54 86 
PALERMO 0,21 45 0,56 45 0,21 121 0,63 121 
PARMA 0,37 18 0,82 18 0,20 76 0,71 76 
PAVIA 0,19 53 0,10 53 0,45 115 0,30 115 
PERUGIA 0,61 64 0,21 64 0,79 102 0,44 102 
PISA 0,63 48 0,56 48 0,21 112 0,23 112 
ROMA La Sapienza 0,24 53 0,09 53 0,28 123 0,32 123 
ROMA Tor Vergata 0,68 40 0,66 40 0,09 89 0,85 89 
SALERNO 0,65 54 0,58 54 0,24 124 0,79 124 
SASSARI 0,29 49 0,11 49 0,92 110 0,30 110 
SIENA 0,12 24 0,20 24 0,57 115 0,78 115 
TORINO 0,74 79 0,80 79 0,33 109 0,54 109 
VITERBO 0,21 45 0,35 45 0,15 105 0,31 105 
VENEZIA Ca’ Foscari 0,36 53 0,46 53 0,09 99 0,19 99 
VENEZIA I.U.A.V. 0,73 26 0,02 26 0,63 84 0,31 84 
BASILICATA 0,86 37 0,20 37 0,30 102 0,38 102 
MOLISE 0,27 43 0,11 43 0,83 54 0,12 54 
VERONA 0,54 32 0,06 32 0,46 103 0,16 103 
NAPOLI Parthenope 0,81 33 0,59 33 0,37 106 0,76 106 
NAPOLI L'Orientale 0,44 32 0,16 32 0,33 84 0,60 84 
PISA Normale 0,11 24 0,69 24 0,42 67 0,14 67 
PISA Sant'Anna 0,1 39 0,03 39 0,35 57 0,19 57 
TRIESTE S.I.S.S.A. 0,89 25 0,59 25 0,83 89 0,83 89 
BRESCIA 0,79 40 0,59 40 0,15 121 0,18 121 
REGGIO CALABRIA 0,81 37 0,88 37 0,90 88 0,20 88 
 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE RESISTANCE: EXPERIENCE FROM PUBLIC SECTOR 101 
Polytechnic BARI 0,35 48 0,93 48 0,10 101 0,36 101 
NAPOLI Seconda 
Università 
0,62 40 0,28 40 0,92 100 0,78 100 
BERGAMO 0,26 30 0,10 30 0,30 82 0,76 82 
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,73 34 0,12 34 0,65 96 0,84 96 
L'AQUILA 0,89 25 0,42 25 0,10 64 0,54 64 
URBINO 0,66 32 0,01 32 0,22 86 0,58 86 
University for 
Foreigners of SIENA 




0,25 21 0,12 21 0,16 56 0,34 56 
ROMA TRE 0,39 24 0,02 24 0,21 70 0,73 70 
TERAMO 0,5 27 0,31 27 0,27 91 0,82 91 
ROMA Foro Italico 0,36 23 0,52 23 0,28 76 0,74 76 
BENEVENTO 0,36 29 0,81 29 0,38 78 0,64 78 
CATANZARO 0,45 31 0,04 31 0,28 76 0,11 76 
MILANO Bicocca 0,67 43 0,26 43 0,16 100 0,73 100 
INSUBRIA 0,86 48 0,26 48 0,21 78 0,23 78 
PIEMONTE 
ORIENTALE 
0,21 62 0,62 62 0,65 78 0,83 78 
FOGGIA 0,59 37 0,42 37 0,84 101 0,70 101 
PAVIA I.U.S.S. 0,64 16 0,39 16 0,19 62 0,21 62 
LUCCA I.M.T. 0,11 19 0,50 19 0,45 79 0,53 79 



















Polytechnic MARCHE 0,25 44 0,62 44 0,72 76 0,48 76 
BARI 0,23 33 0,24 33 0,19 114 0,38 114 
BOLOGNA 0,52 69 0,79 69 0,95 92 0,82 92 
CAGLIARI 0,55 45 0,94 45 0,92 96 0,90 96 
CASSINO 0,09 27 0,33 27 0,03 50 0,27 50 
CATANIA 0,63 37 0,52 37 0,61 100 0,60 100 
FERRARA 0,37 46 0,40 46 0,28 101 0,31 101 
FIRENZE 0,89 33 0,08 33 0,64 111 0,97 111 
GENOVA 0,3 57 0,73 57 0,57 97 0,50 97 
SALENTO 0,5 41 0,87 41 0,28 108 0,62 108 
MACERATA 0,61 29 0,30 29 0,98 79 0,21 79 
MESSINA 0,15 30 0,87 30 0,51 131 0,09 131 
MILANO 0,16 41 0,65 41 0,92 100 0,33 100 
Polytechnic MILANO 0,82 39 0,55 39 0,79 100 0,84 100 
MODENA and 
REGGIO EMILIA 
0,66 45 0,18 45 0,92 123 0,67 123 
NAPOLI Federico II 0,15 58 0,65 58 0,80 122 0,48 122 
PADOVA 0,35 48 0,38 48 0,58 88 0,54 88 
PALERMO 0,44 42 0,56 42 0,21 122 0,63 122 
PARMA 0,73 17 0,82 17 0,20 77 0,71 77 
PAVIA 0,58 50 0,10 50 0,45 115 0,30 115 
PERUGIA 0,24 61 0,21 61 0,79 105 0,44 105 
PISA 0,64 47 0,56 47 0,21 112 0,23 112 
ROMA La Sapienza 0,09 50 0,09 50 0,28 120 0,32 120 
ROMA Tor Vergata 0,59 37 0,66 37 0,09 91 0,85 91 
SALERNO 0,31 56 0,58 56 0,24 126 0,79 126 
SASSARI 0,23 48 0,11 48 0,92 112 0,30 112 
SIENA 0,73 27 0,20 27 0,57 113 0,78 113 
TORINO 0,76 82 0,80 82 0,33 112 0,54 112 
VITERBO 0,52 45 0,35 45 0,15 104 0,31 104 
VENEZIA Ca’ Foscari 0,76 55 0,46 55 0,09 96 0,19 96 
VENEZIA I.U.A.V. 0,45 28 0,02 28 0,63 83 0,31 83 
BASILICATA 0,86 40 0,20 40 0,30 99 0,38 99 
MOLISE 0,28 43 0,11 43 0,83 52 0,12 52 
VERONA 0,83 30 0,06 30 0,46 106 0,16 106 
 102  Journal of Economic and Social Development, Vol 2, No 1 
NAPOLI Parthenope 0,81 35 0,59 35 0,37 105 0,76 105 
NAPOLI L'Orientale 0,51 34 0,16 34 0,33 87 0,60 87 
PISA Normale 0,36 25 0,69 25 0,42 67 0,14 67 
PISA Sant'Anna 0,63 41 0,03 41 0,35 57 0,19 57 
TRIESTE S.I.S.S.A. 0,22 23 0,59 23 0,83 86 0,83 86 
BRESCIA 0,69 42 0,59 42 0,15 119 0,18 119 
REGGIO CALABRIA 0,62 35 0,88 35 0,90 87 0,20 87 
Polytechnic BARI 0,39 47 0,93 47 0,10 102 0,36 102 
NAPOLI Seconda 
Università 
0,34 39 0,28 39 0,92 97 0,78 97 
BERGAMO 0,78 30 0,10 30 0,30 80 0,76 80 
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,28 31 0,12 31 0,65 95 0,84 95 
L'AQUILA 0,56 23 0,42 23 0,10 65 0,54 65 
URBINO 0,08 35 0,01 35 0,22 84 0,58 84 
University for 
Foreigners of SIENA 




0,55 19 0,12 19 0,16 59 0,34 59 
ROMA TRE 0,38 27 0,02 27 0,21 73 0,73 73 
TERAMO 0,91 27 0,31 27 0,27 90 0,82 90 
ROMA Foro Italico 0,52 23 0,52 23 0,28 76 0,74 76 
BENEVENTO 0,15 27 0,81 27 0,38 79 0,64 79 
CATANZARO 0,62 32 0,04 32 0,28 73 0,11 73 
MILANO Bicocca 0,56 42 0,26 42 0,16 103 0,73 103 
INSUBRIA 0,2 47 0,26 47 0,21 78 0,23 78 
PIEMONTE 
ORIENTALE 
0,47 64 0,62 64 0,65 75 0,83 75 
FOGGIA 0,67 37 0,42 37 0,84 104 0,70 104 
PAVIA I.U.S.S. 0,63 19 0,39 19 0,19 63 0,21 63 
LUCCA I.M.T. 0,34 17 0,50 17 0,45 80 0,53 80 



















Polytechnic MARCHE 0,55 46 0,12 46 0,56 78 0,23 78 
BARI 0,92 31 0,24 31 0,19 115 0,38 115 
BOLOGNA 0,77 66 0,79 66 0,95 92 0,82 92 
CAGLIARI 0,41 48 0,94 48 0,92 93 0,90 93 
CASSINO 0,43 30 0,33 30 0,03 48 0,27 48 
CATANIA 0,25 40 0,52 40 0,61 102 0,60 102 
FERRARA 0,56 44 0,40 44 0,28 99 0,31 99 
FIRENZE 0,82 36 0,08 36 0,64 110 0,97 110 
GENOVA 0,40 59 0,73 59 0,57 98 0,50 98 
SALENTO 0,34 40 0,87 40 0,28 111 0,62 111 
MACERATA 0,25 26 0,30 26 0,98 77 0,21 77 
MESSINA 0,53 30 0,87 30 0,51 129 0,09 129 
MILANO 0,24 41 0,65 41 0,92 101 0,33 101 
Polytechnic MILANO 0,50 40 0,55 40 0,79 97 0,84 97 
MODENA and 
REGGIO EMILIA 
0,20 46 0,18 46 0,92 120 0,67 120 
NAPOLI Federico II 0,70 60 0,65 60 0,80 123 0,48 123 
PADOVA 0,83 46 0,38 46 0,58 89 0,54 89 
PALERMO 0,52 44 0,56 44 0,21 125 0,63 125 
PARMA 0,55 15 0,82 15 0,20 74 0,71 74 
PAVIA 0,56 53 0,10 53 0,45 118 0,30 118 
PERUGIA 0,87 63 0,21 63 0,79 104 0,44 104 
PISA 0,17 45 0,56 45 0,21 109 0,23 109 
ROMA La Sapienza 0,71 50 0,09 50 0,28 121 0,32 121 
ROMA Tor Vergata 0,16 39 0,66 39 0,09 94 0,85 94 
SALERNO 0,53 53 0,58 53 0,24 127 0,79 127 
SASSARI 0,78 47 0,11 47 0,92 115 0,30 115 
SIENA 0,54 25 0,20 25 0,57 115 0,78 115 
 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE RESISTANCE: EXPERIENCE FROM PUBLIC SECTOR 103 
TORINO 0,50 83 0,80 83 0,33 112 0,54 112 
VITERBO 0,36 42 0,35 42 0,15 106 0,31 106 
VENEZIA Ca’ Foscari 0,20 58 0,46 58 0,09 97 0,19 97 
VENEZIA I.U.A.V. 0,75 27 0,02 27 0,63 82 0,31 82 
BASILICATA 0,29 40 0,20 40 0,30 99 0,38 99 
MOLISE 0,20 46 0,11 46 0,83 50 0,12 50 
VERONA 0,45 32 0,06 32 0,46 107 0,16 107 
NAPOLI Parthenope 0,08 37 0,59 37 0,37 103 0,76 103 
NAPOLI L'Orientale 0,70 33 0,16 33 0,33 90 0,60 90 
PISA Normale 0,17 25 0,69 25 0,42 64 0,14 64 
PISA Sant'Anna 0,42 40 0,03 40 0,35 55 0,19 55 
TRIESTE S.I.S.S.A. 0,36 22 0,59 22 0,83 88 0,83 88 
BRESCIA 0,09 39 0,59 39 0,15 122 0,18 122 
REGGIO CALABRIA 0,76 34 0,88 34 0,90 86 0,20 86 
Polytechnic BARI 0,38 49 0,93 49 0,10 105 0,36 105 
NAPOLI Seconda 
Università 
0,22 39 0,28 39 0,92 98 0,78 98 
BERGAMO 0,69 33 0,10 33 0,30 81 0,76 81 
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,20 32 0,12 32 0,65 97 0,84 97 
L'AQUILA 0,89 26 0,42 26 0,10 66 0,54 66 
URBINO 0,52 32 0,01 32 0,22 81 0,58 81 
University for 
Foreigners of SIENA 




0,56 20 0,12 20 0,16 60 0,34 60 
ROMA TRE 0,63 28 0,02 28 0,21 72 0,73 72 
TERAMO 0,85 30 0,31 30 0,27 91 0,82 91 
ROMA Foro Italico 0,44 24 0,52 24 0,28 77 0,74 77 
BENEVENTO 0,14 26 0,81 26 0,38 76 0,64 76 
CATANZARO 0,80 35 0,04 35 0,28 71 0,11 71 
MILANO Bicocca 0,87 43 0,26 43 0,16 100 0,73 100 
INSUBRIA 0,18 46 0,26 46 0,21 75 0,23 75 
PIEMONTE 
ORIENTALE 
0,21 65 0,62 65 0,65 73 0,83 73 
FOGGIA 0,44 39 0,42 39 0,84 107 0,70 107 
PAVIA I.U.S.S. 0,24 22 0,39 22 0,19 62 0,21 62 
LUCCA I.M.T. 0,13 20 0,50 20 0,45 79 0,53 79 



















Polytechnic MARCHE 0,65 47 0,13 47 0,61 79 0,80 79 
BARI 0,30 31 0,24 31 0,19 116 0,38 116 
BOLOGNA 0,46 63 0,79 63 0,95 89 0,82 89 
CAGLIARI 0,20 46 0,94 46 0,92 91 0,90 91 
CASSINO 0,15 29 0,33 29 0,03 48 0,27 48 
CATANIA 0,22 39 0,52 39 0,61 103 0,60 103 
FERRARA 0,33 44 0,40 44 0,28 102 0,31 102 
FIRENZE 0,10 37 0,08 37 0,64 113 0,97 113 
GENOVA 0,38 56 0,73 56 0,57 96 0,50 96 
SALENTO 0,40 39 0,87 39 0,28 114 0,62 114 
MACERATA 0,67 24 0,30 24 0,98 80 0,21 80 
MESSINA 0,24 28 0,87 28 0,51 129 0,09 129 
MILANO 0,42 44 0,65 44 0,92 103 0,33 103 
Polytechnic MILANO 0,11 40 0,55 40 0,79 96 0,84 96 
MODENA and 
REGGIO EMILIA 
0,22 48 0,18 48 0,92 121 0,67 121 
NAPOLI Federico II 0,25 57 0,65 57 0,80 124 0,48 124 
PADOVA 0,16 44 0,38 44 0,58 91 0,54 91 
PALERMO 0,69 47 0,56 47 0,21 124 0,63 124 
PARMA 0,77 17 0,82 17 0,20 71 0,71 71 
PAVIA 0,76 51 0,10 51 0,45 119 0,30 119 
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PERUGIA 0,39 64 0,21 64 0,79 107 0,44 107 
PISA 0,63 48 0,56 48 0,21 106 0,23 106 
ROMA La Sapienza 0,08 51 0,09 51 0,28 120 0,32 120 
ROMA Tor Vergata 0,19 36 0,66 36 0,09 97 0,85 97 
SALERNO 0,84 56 0,58 56 0,24 129 0,79 129 
SASSARI 0,78 50 0,11 50 0,92 115 0,30 115 
SIENA 0,78 26 0,20 26 0,57 115 0,78 115 
TORINO 0,32 81 0,80 81 0,33 112 0,54 112 
VITERBO 0,90 45 0,35 45 0,15 105 0,31 105 
VENEZIA Ca’ Foscari 0,90 61 0,46 61 0,09 94 0,19 94 
VENEZIA I.U.A.V. 0,72 25 0,02 25 0,63 81 0,31 81 
BASILICATA 0,60 38 0,20 38 0,30 100 0,38 100 
MOLISE 0,38 48 0,11 48 0,83 50 0,12 50 
VERONA 0,65 29 0,06 29 0,46 110 0,16 110 
NAPOLI Parthenope 0,59 37 0,59 37 0,37 105 0,76 105 
NAPOLI L'Orientale 0,90 34 0,16 34 0,33 89 0,60 89 
PISA Normale 0,78 25 0,69 25 0,42 66 0,14 66 
PISA Sant'Anna 0,54 41 0,03 41 0,35 53 0,19 53 
TRIESTE S.I.S.S.A. 0,13 25 0,59 25 0,83 87 0,83 87 
BRESCIA 0,26 42 0,59 42 0,15 120 0,18 120 
REGGIO CALABRIA 0,30 34 0,88 34 0,90 85 0,20 85 
Polytechnic BARI 0,64 49 0,93 49 0,10 106 0,36 106 
NAPOLI Seconda 
Università 
0,47 36 0,28 36 0,92 97 0,78 97 
BERGAMO 0,41 32 0,10 32 0,30 79 0,76 79 
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,70 31 0,12 31 0,65 94 0,84 94 
L'AQUILA 0,34 23 0,42 23 0,10 66 0,54 66 
URBINO 0,44 30 0,01 30 0,22 84 0,58 84 
University for 
Foreigners of SIENA 




0,61 17 0,12 17 0,16 62 0,34 62 
ROMA TRE 0,48 27 0,02 27 0,21 75 0,73 75 
TERAMO 0,13 33 0,31 33 0,27 91 0,82 91 
ROMA Foro Italico 0,24 27 0,52 27 0,28 76 0,74 76 
BENEVENTO 0,70 25 0,81 25 0,38 73 0,64 73 
CATANZARO 0,67 35 0,04 35 0,28 68 0,11 68 
MILANO Bicocca 0,79 46 0,26 46 0,16 100 0,73 100 
INSUBRIA 0,72 48 0,26 48 0,21 73 0,23 73 
PIEMONTE 
ORIENTALE 
0,53 64 0,62 64 0,65 72 0,83 72 
FOGGIA 0,34 40 0,42 40 0,84 104 0,70 104 
PAVIA I.U.S.S. 0,33 24 0,39 24 0,19 64 0,21 64 
LUCCA I.M.T. 0,30 19 0,50 19 0,45 78 0,53 78 



















Polytechnic MARCHE 0,29 45 0,68 45 0,22 77 0,38 77 
BARI 0,56 31 0,24 31 0,19 119 0,38 119 
BOLOGNA 0,28 65 0,79 65 0,95 86 0,82 86 
CAGLIARI 0,60 43 0,94 43 0,92 91 0,90 91 
CASSINO 0,53 27 0,33 27 0,03 49 0,27 49 
CATANIA 0,63 38 0,52 38 0,61 105 0,60 105 
FERRARA 0,80 46 0,40 46 0,28 99 0,31 99 
FIRENZE 0,77 35 0,08 35 0,64 111 0,97 111 
GENOVA 0,74 53 0,73 53 0,57 97 0,50 97 
SALENTO 0,18 36 0,87 36 0,28 112 0,62 112 
MACERATA 0,74 25 0,30 25 0,98 83 0,21 83 
MESSINA 0,83 25 0,87 25 0,51 130 0,09 130 
MILANO 0,76 41 0,65 41 0,92 101 0,33 101 
Polytechnic MILANO 0,39 43 0,55 43 0,79 93 0,84 93 
 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE RESISTANCE: EXPERIENCE FROM PUBLIC SECTOR 105 
MODENA and 
REGGIO EMILIA 
0,25 51 0,18 51 0,92 118 0,67 118 
NAPOLI Federico II 0,69 56 0,65 56 0,80 121 0,48 121 
PADOVA 0,44 43 0,38 43 0,58 93 0,54 93 
PALERMO 0,38 49 0,56 49 0,21 122 0,63 122 
PARMA 0,20 17 0,82 17 0,20 68 0,71 68 
PAVIA 0,72 53 0,10 53 0,45 118 0,30 118 
PERUGIA 0,46 61 0,21 61 0,79 106 0,44 106 
PISA 0,92 49 0,56 49 0,21 109 0,23 109 
ROMA La Sapienza 0,32 52 0,09 52 0,28 123 0,32 123 
ROMA Tor Vergata 0,53 38 0,66 38 0,09 97 0,85 97 
SALERNO 0,49 55 0,58 55 0,24 126 0,79 126 
SASSARI 0,16 53 0,11 53 0,92 118 0,30 118 
SIENA 0,35 24 0,20 24 0,57 115 0,78 115 
TORINO 0,85 80 0,80 80 0,33 113 0,54 113 
VITERBO 0,40 44 0,35 44 0,15 107 0,31 107 
VENEZIA Ca’ Foscari 0,21 59 0,46 59 0,09 91 0,19 91 
VENEZIA I.U.A.V. 0,41 23 0,02 23 0,63 81 0,31 81 
BASILICATA 0,50 38 0,20 38 0,30 99 0,38 99 
MOLISE 0,45 51 0,11 51 0,83 52 0,12 52 
VERONA 0,47 28 0,06 28 0,46 111 0,16 111 
NAPOLI Parthenope 0,70 39 0,59 39 0,37 108 0,76 108 
NAPOLI L'Orientale 0,87 31 0,16 31 0,33 92 0,60 92 
PISA Normale 0,46 23 0,69 23 0,42 69 0,14 69 
PISA Sant'Anna 0,33 39 0,03 39 0,35 51 0,19 51 
TRIESTE S.I.S.S.A. 0,44 24 0,59 24 0,83 86 0,83 86 
BRESCIA 0,77 40 0,59 40 0,15 121 0,18 121 
REGGIO CALABRIA 0,75 36 0,88 36 0,90 87 0,20 87 
Polytechnic BARI 0,13 48 0,93 48 0,10 105 0,36 105 
NAPOLI Seconda 
Università 
0,31 37 0,28 37 0,92 95 0,78 95 
BERGAMO 0,92 30 0,10 30 0,30 78 0,76 78 
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,85 34 0,12 34 0,65 93 0,84 93 
L'AQUILA 0,65 21 0,42 21 0,10 67 0,54 67 
URBINO 0,32 30 0,01 30 0,22 86 0,58 86 
University for 
Foreigners of SIENA 




0,46 17 0,12 17 0,16 65 0,34 65 
ROMA TRE 0,28 26 0,02 26 0,21 78 0,73 78 
TERAMO 0,16 36 0,31 36 0,27 92 0,82 92 
ROMA Foro Italico 0,81 25 0,52 25 0,28 76 0,74 76 
BENEVENTO 0,35 28 0,81 28 0,38 76 0,64 76 
CATANZARO 0,73 37 0,04 37 0,28 71 0,11 71 
MILANO Bicocca 0,86 48 0,26 48 0,16 100 0,73 100 
INSUBRIA 0,33 45 0,26 45 0,21 76 0,23 76 
PIEMONTE 
ORIENTALE 
0,50 64 0,62 64 0,65 72 0,83 72 
FOGGIA 0,09 43 0,42 43 0,84 102 0,70 102 
PAVIA I.U.S.S. 0,42 25 0,39 25 0,19 61 0,21 61 
LUCCA I.M.T. 0,34 17 0,50 17 0,45 76 0,53 76 



















Polytechnic MARCHE 0,15 44 0,22 44 0,62 74 0,09 74 
BARI 0,40 31 0,24 31 0,19 117 0,38 117 
BOLOGNA 0,76 68 0,79 68 0,95 85 0,82 85 
CAGLIARI 0,49 42 0,94 42 0,92 94 0,90 94 
CASSINO 0,63 24 0,33 24 0,03 46 0,27 46 
CATANIA 0,29 41 0,52 41 0,61 106 0,60 106 
FERRARA 0,80 45 0,40 45 0,28 99 0,31 99 
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FIRENZE 0,42 36 0,08 36 0,64 108 0,97 108 
GENOVA 0,15 51 0,73 51 0,57 97 0,50 97 
SALENTO 0,62 34 0,87 34 0,28 115 0,62 115 
MACERATA 0,14 25 0,30 25 0,98 85 0,21 85 
MESSINA 0,76 24 0,87 24 0,51 127 0,09 127 
MILANO 0,54 43 0,65 43 0,92 104 0,33 104 
Polytechnic MILANO 0,78 46 0,55 46 0,79 90 0,84 90 
MODENA and 
REGGIO EMILIA 
0,62 51 0,18 51 0,92 117 0,67 117 
NAPOLI Federico II 0,61 58 0,65 58 0,80 120 0,48 120 
PADOVA 0,16 46 0,38 46 0,58 93 0,54 93 
PALERMO 0,84 50 0,56 50 0,21 124 0,63 124 
PARMA 0,81 18 0,82 18 0,20 71 0,71 71 
PAVIA 0,42 50 0,10 50 0,45 121 0,30 121 
PERUGIA 0,38 61 0,21 61 0,79 107 0,44 107 
PISA 0,31 49 0,56 49 0,21 111 0,23 111 
ROMA La Sapienza 0,43 55 0,09 55 0,28 120 0,32 120 
ROMA Tor Vergata 0,87 41 0,66 41 0,09 95 0,85 95 
SALERNO 0,54 54 0,58 54 0,24 128 0,79 128 
SASSARI 0,68 51 0,11 51 0,92 121 0,30 121 
SIENA 0,68 21 0,20 21 0,57 114 0,78 114 
TORINO 0,61 83 0,80 83 0,33 116 0,54 116 
VITERBO 0,77 46 0,35 46 0,15 104 0,31 104 
VENEZIA Ca’ Foscari 0,24 62 0,46 62 0,09 93 0,19 93 
VENEZIA I.U.A.V. 0,47 25 0,02 25 0,63 80 0,31 80 
BASILICATA 0,34 40 0,20 40 0,30 99 0,38 99 
MOLISE 0,37 50 0,11 50 0,83 53 0,12 53 
VERONA 0,72 31 0,06 31 0,46 108 0,16 108 
NAPOLI Parthenope 0,28 39 0,59 39 0,37 107 0,76 107 
NAPOLI L'Orientale 0,45 30 0,16 30 0,33 93 0,60 93 
PISA Normale 0,25 24 0,69 24 0,42 66 0,14 66 
PISA Sant'Anna 0,81 36 0,03 36 0,35 50 0,19 50 
TRIESTE S.I.S.S.A. 0,52 22 0,59 22 0,83 87 0,83 87 
BRESCIA 0,24 39 0,59 39 0,15 121 0,18 121 
REGGIO CALABRIA 0,77 34 0,88 34 0,90 87 0,20 87 
Polytechnic BARI 0,72 48 0,93 48 0,10 107 0,36 107 
NAPOLI Seconda 
Università 
0,83 38 0,28 38 0,92 97 0,78 97 
BERGAMO 0,27 31 0,10 31 0,30 81 0,76 81 
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,53 31 0,12 31 0,65 90 0,84 90 
L'AQUILA 0,31 22 0,42 22 0,10 68 0,54 68 
URBINO 0,35 28 0,01 28 0,22 84 0,58 84 
University for 
Foreigners of SIENA 




0,87 20 0,12 20 0,16 66 0,34 66 
ROMA TRE 0,08 26 0,02 26 0,21 81 0,73 81 
TERAMO 0,19 35 0,31 35 0,27 89 0,82 89 
ROMA Foro Italico 0,22 22 0,52 22 0,28 75 0,74 75 
BENEVENTO 0,09 29 0,81 29 0,38 77 0,64 77 
CATANZARO 0,38 40 0,04 40 0,28 74 0,11 74 
MILANO Bicocca 0,47 49 0,26 49 0,16 97 0,73 97 
INSUBRIA 0,57 48 0,26 48 0,21 79 0,23 79 
PIEMONTE 
ORIENTALE 
0,52 61 0,62 61 0,65 74 0,83 74 
FOGGIA 0,60 41 0,42 41 0,84 103 0,70 103 
PAVIA I.U.S.S. 0,22 22 0,39 22 0,19 63 0,21 63 
LUCCA I.M.T. 0,64 17 0,50 17 0,45 79 0,53 79 



















 ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE RESISTANCE: EXPERIENCE FROM PUBLIC SECTOR 107 
Polytechnic MARCHE 0,12 43 0,11 43 0,51 75 0,73 75 
BARI 0,11 28 0,24 28 0,19 115 0,38 115 
BOLOGNA 0,17 69 0,79 69 0,95 84 0,82 84 
CAGLIARI 0,56 41 0,94 41 0,92 91 0,90 91 
CASSINO 0,60 21 0,33 21 0,03 47 0,27 47 
CATANIA 0,44 44 0,52 44 0,61 107 0,60 107 
FERRARA 0,92 44 0,40 44 0,28 100 0,31 100 
FIRENZE 0,74 36 0,08 36 0,64 110 0,97 110 
GENOVA 0,75 49 0,73 49 0,57 99 0,50 99 
SALENTO 0,38 36 0,87 36 0,28 116 0,62 116 
MACERATA 0,27 28 0,30 28 0,98 84 0,21 84 
MESSINA 0,50 26 0,87 26 0,51 127 0,09 127 
MILANO 0,50 45 0,65 45 0,92 104 0,33 104 
Polytechnic MILANO 0,92 45 0,55 45 0,79 92 0,84 92 
MODENA and 
REGGIO EMILIA 
0,09 52 0,18 52 0,92 114 0,67 114 
NAPOLI Federico II 0,37 59 0,65 59 0,80 117 0,48 117 
PADOVA 0,86 46 0,38 46 0,58 95 0,54 95 
PALERMO 0,78 53 0,56 53 0,21 125 0,63 125 
PARMA 0,85 16 0,82 16 0,20 72 0,71 72 
PAVIA 0,45 53 0,10 53 0,45 124 0,30 124 
PERUGIA 0,37 62 0,21 62 0,79 107 0,44 107 
PISA 0,46 47 0,56 47 0,21 110 0,23 110 
ROMA La Sapienza 0,60 55 0,09 55 0,28 119 0,32 119 
ROMA Tor Vergata 0,75 44 0,66 44 0,09 97 0,85 97 
SALERNO 0,46 56 0,58 56 0,24 129 0,79 129 
SASSARI 0,60 51 0,11 51 0,92 121 0,30 121 
SIENA 0,36 22 0,20 22 0,57 112 0,78 112 
TORINO 0,24 85 0,80 85 0,33 116 0,54 116 
VITERBO 0,10 49 0,35 49 0,15 102 0,31 102 
VENEZIA Ca’ Foscari 0,78 64 0,46 64 0,09 91 0,19 91 
VENEZIA I.U.A.V. 0,35 24 0,02 24 0,63 77 0,31 77 
BASILICATA 0,41 42 0,20 42 0,30 102 0,38 102 
MOLISE 0,31 52 0,11 52 0,83 52 0,12 52 
VERONA 0,76 31 0,06 31 0,46 107 0,16 107 
NAPOLI Parthenope 0,79 41 0,59 41 0,37 104 0,76 104 
NAPOLI L'Orientale 0,32 32 0,16 32 0,33 96 0,60 96 
PISA Normale 0,52 22 0,69 22 0,42 63 0,14 63 
PISA Sant'Anna 0,08 36 0,03 36 0,35 48 0,19 48 
TRIESTE S.I.S.S.A. 0,24 21 0,59 21 0,83 86 0,83 86 
BRESCIA 0,44 40 0,59 40 0,15 123 0,18 123 
REGGIO CALABRIA 0,17 33 0,88 33 0,90 84 0,20 84 
Polytechnic BARI 0,90 51 0,93 51 0,10 110 0,36 110 
NAPOLI Seconda 
Università 
0,89 36 0,28 36 0,92 96 0,78 96 
BERGAMO 0,43 28 0,10 28 0,30 84 0,76 84 
CHIETI-PESCARA 0,52 34 0,12 34 0,65 90 0,84 90 
L'AQUILA 0,84 20 0,42 20 0,10 66 0,54 66 
URBINO 0,46 29 0,01 29 0,22 82 0,58 82 
University for 
Foreigners of SIENA 




0,88 22 0,12 22 0,16 67 0,34 67 
ROMA TRE 0,73 28 0,02 28 0,21 82 0,73 82 
TERAMO 0,23 38 0,31 38 0,27 91 0,82 91 
ROMA Foro Italico 0,13 22 0,52 22 0,28 77 0,74 77 
BENEVENTO 0,43 26 0,81 26 0,38 75 0,64 75 
CATANZARO 0,83 42 0,04 42 0,28 71 0,11 71 
MILANO Bicocca 0,78 51 0,26 51 0,16 98 0,73 98 
INSUBRIA 0,59 46 0,26 46 0,21 81 0,23 81 
PIEMONTE 
ORIENTALE 
0,10 59 0,62 59 0,65 76 0,83 76 
FOGGIA 0,79 43 0,42 43 0,84 104 0,70 104 
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PAVIA I.U.S.S. 0,59 20 0,39 20 0,19 65 0,21 65 
LUCCA I.M.T. 0,92 15 0,50 15 0,45 78 0,53 78 
 
